With the 'cultural turn', the concept of culture has assumed enormous importance in or the limited constitutional recognition of cultural difference; it can also refer to court; there are only specific, context-dependent multicultural problematiques'. .. history to continuing conflicts between 'anxious' and relaxed nationalists. The term multiculturalism has a range of meanings within the contexts of sociology, of political In reference to sociology, multiculturalism is the end-state of either a natural or Mauritius; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan . of relationship between different cultural communities", which means that the. Any conceptual or empirical analysis of the relations between 'nationalism' and discussion that follows, the word 'multiculturalism' will refer exclusively, not to the fact of of most contemporary liberal democracies—but to a specific kind of political .. Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts', Uni-versity of.
Rights to Culture, Participation Many governments, even liberal and democratic, resist acceptance of rights of national minorities out of fear of fostering different loyalties that could be threatening to territorial integrity and social cohesion of their states.
According to Kymlicka, the securitization of the minority question is particularly evident in the post-communist Eastern Europe, which impedes the democratic management of interethnic relations in the region. In this view, emphasis on security erodes the democratic space for voicing minority demands and reduces the likelihood that those demands will be accepted and treated as a matter of normal democratic politics. Kymlicka contrasts the situation in Eastern Europe with that of Western Europe and North America, where the question of national minorities has been desecuritized and the states are much more at ease with accepting devolution of powers and territorial autonomies.
He suggests that the same should happen in Eastern Europe—minority rights should be treated as a matter of justice and not that of security. The first has to do with the legacy of pseudo-federalism and lack of traditions of democratic coexistence between different ethnic groups. Historic legacies also exacerbate the problem, particularly when a kin-State in question is a former imperial power. He seems to suggest that risks are more perceived than real and that states should simply accept minority claims, including the right to secession because there is simply no other democratic and better alternative.
In a majority of cases kin-state factors are absent and both majority and minority groups benefit from the EU as well as from economic prosperity and democratic stability characteristic to the whole area.
Even if the Basque Country and Scotland decide to secede and form an independent state, there is no real expectation that these newly formed states would be hostile to either Spain or Britain and pose any serious danger to them. In contrast, if Abkhazia secedes from Georgia there is a real danger that it will turn into a stronghold of the Russian military and fleet, hostile to Georgia.
At the same time, Western Europe is much more cautious in treating its growing migrant communities as ethnic minorities and according them similar rights as they do to their traditional minorities. Recent immigrants, particularly from Muslim countries, are perceived as much more of a security risk to West European states and thus the emphasis is put on their assimilation and integration into mainstream society rather than on the protection and promotion of their culture and identity.
Certainly policies of multiculturalism and interculturalism adopted by a number of Western states aimed at respecting and accommodating certain cultural differences and practices, while at the same time integrating them into the dominant culture and institutions. However, the terms of integration offered to members of immigrant migrant communities and people belonging to traditional national minorities are quite different.
Moreover, in many West European states—including Britain, the Netherlands, and others—that suffered from terrorist attacks, there seems to be a growing backlash against multiculturalism which is blamed for fostering ethnocultural difference and undermining social cohesion of increasingly diverse and pluralist states. On the one hand, growing globalization manifested in the spread of certain political, economic and ideational influences can have a conflict preventing effect.
For instance, many Georgians would argue, nationalists included, that prospects for peace and stability for the country and the region on the whole are far greater with a greater inter national presence on the ground, including through international organizations, embassies, NGOs, foreign companies, and ideally through eventual membership to NATO and the EU.
Even multinational companies and their investments are seen as certain security guarantees that should be courted not only for material and economic reasons but also for political, national security considerations. On the other hand, however, increasing immigration and movement of people associated with globalization may create new sources of tension and pose new difficulties to the management of cultural and ethnic diversity in democratic states.
This is the area where globalization is truly challenging nationalism. Political essence of nationalism requires that national communities, pluralistic or homogenous, retain certain cohesion and unity in order to survive and flourish in international conditions that have prevailed at least since the modern era.
Globalization, however, through growing immigration, makes the attainment of such unity and cohesion increasingly difficult. It also introduces new risks and security challenges that cannot be easily addressed through traditional defense mechanisms and security policies. A complete disengagement from globalization is not an option because the costs involved are too high not least for the purposes of security and stability.
The dilemma for the majority of states today, therefore, is how to continue benefiting from globalization, while minimizing its risks. The alleged demise of the territorial sovereign state has been a prominent feature of the globalization literature.
In this view, globalization is a phenomenon driven by technological innovations and markets not by governments. Collision Course or Virtuous Circle Moreover, states appear to be pressured into adopting market friendly policies, cutting back on the role of the public sector and accepting increasing liberalization of their economies.
The fundamental transformation of this system thus should have a significant impact on the role and function of nationalism. The question, however, is whether contemporary globalization is producing such a fundamental change. First, those who claim the imminent demise of the state seem to imply that in the not so distant past states were all-powerful entities fully in control of most aspects of public life.
Historic evidence, however, is much more mixed. As Stephen Del Rosso Jr. If anything, the sanctity of borders with few exceptions and the respect for basic principles of international law is far greater today than before.
This is partly the reason why many small states that once might have been swallowed up or dismembered by stronger neighbors are able to survive with their autonomy and independence intact.
New Press; also Paul Hirst a It is therefore unreasonable to expect that all states, irrespective of their differences, could be affected by globalization in the same way.
Governments of some states, especially of the big and powerful ones, are not passive on-lookers of globalization—they shape it and define the rules of the game. I have argued that in the case of Georgia, globalization has sustained the fragile, newly independent Georgian state and can be regarded as a force contributing to its viability and survival. At the same time, Russian actions in Georgia demonstrated that globalization offers no protection from power-politics and neither does it make power-political competition among states irrelevant.
Global markets, however, depend on a well-developed set of rules, norms and regulations for their day-to-day functioning.
Global actors, including multinational companies, are attracted mainly to those markets that are under effective control of states. States therefore matter greatly in providing the right conditions and stimulus for globalization to work. At a time of crisis, the role of states is even more pronounced as governments are expected to step in and cushion painful effects of a financial and economic meltdown. In fact, what the future holds for globalization as we know it is entirely unclear as consequences of the current crisis and its handling by states begin to emerge.
This is a good indication that globalization is a reversible phenomenon should major states so decide. As Andrew Hurrell has argued, the move to economic multilateralism should be explained by consequences of the Second World War and security concerns during the Cold War. Equally, sincestates have stepped up their efforts to reassert control over transnational flows of money, people, ideas, and military technology that became essential in the ear of new security challenges such as transnational terrorism.
Nationalism promotes globalization in so far as, and as long as, globalization is desirable for national power and security and does not fundamentally challenge the system of nation-states.
Multiculturalism - Wikipedia
Even though many changes and challenges of globalization are real, they do not amount to some sort of deep change or a fundamental transformation. Firstly, it has to do with the management of interethnic tensions and conflicts that came to be seen as major security challenges in the post-Cold War era. The role and effect of globalization in this context is not as negative as it is often assumed.
Globalization has a potential of containing aggressive nationalism that thrives on isolation and insecurity. It may also create incentives for the resolution and prevention of conflicts by offering benefits of integration to various multilateral structures and greater prospects for economic development and prosperity. Multiculturalism is seen by its supporters as a fairer system that allows people to truly express who they are within a society, that is more tolerant and that adapts better to social issues.
Historically, support for modern multiculturalism stems from the changes in Western societies after World War II, in what Susanne Wessendorf calls the "human rights revolution", in which the horrors of institutionalized racism and ethnic cleansing became almost impossible to ignore in the wake of the Holocaust ; with the collapse of the European colonial systemas colonized nations in Africa and Asia successfully fought for their independence and pointed out the discriminatory underpinnings of the colonial system; and, in the United States in particular, with the rise of the Civil Rights Movementwhich criticized ideals of assimilation that often led to prejudices against those who did not act according to Anglo-American standards and which led to the development of academic ethnic studies programs as a way to counteract the neglect of contributions by racial minorities in classrooms.
The contact hypothesis in sociology is a well documented phenomenon in which cooperative interactions with those from a different group than one's own reduce prejudice and inter-group hostility.
James Trotman argues that multiculturalism is valuable because it "uses several disciplines to highlight neglected aspects of our social history, particularly the histories of women and minorities [ Instead, he argues that multiculturalism is in fact "not about minorities" but "is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities", which means that the standards by which the communities resolve their differences, e.
Criticism of multiculturalism Critics of multiculturalism often debate whether the multicultural ideal of benignly co-existing cultures that interrelate and influence one another, and yet remain distinct, is sustainable, paradoxical, or even desirable. Putnam conducted a nearly decade-long study on how multiculturalism affects social trust.
We act like turtles. The effect of diversity is worse than had been imagined. Williams and the book edited by Duncan Bell It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about nation-state, i.
Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them?
The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular the ultimate moral issue is the following: For debates on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith and, more recently, Feltham and Cottingham Why do nationalist claims require a defense?Imperialism: Crash Course World History #35
In some situations they seem plausible: Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept.
Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own.
The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals' right to autonomy. Also, construed too strictly these duties can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-DavisMoller-Okinandand the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al.
Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture. Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation.
The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so.
Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life.
The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread. The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: According to some authors McCabethe invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others.
The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye.
This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient. Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these.
In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case. Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.
It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular.
For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate. These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets.
SAGE Reference - Analysing Multiculturalism Today
The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies. The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values.
Here is a characterization. The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues in the case under consideration, on nationalism that justifies a given political arrangement here, a nation-state by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity in a deeper, philosophical sense.
The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task.
Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature. But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above: The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity. The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong.
The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other. Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers.
The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation's members.
A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort: Cosmopolitanism is the view that one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings regardless of geographical or cultural distanceand political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states.
Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent, since human beings generally strive best under some global institutional arrangement like ours that concentrates power and authority at the level of states. Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism ibid, The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlinand Taylorand its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael TamirDavid Miller,Kai NielsenMichel Seymour and Chaim Gans See also the debate around Miller's work in De Schutter and Tinnevelt In the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light, for instance in Miller aSung Ho Kim or Brian Vick Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.
It is important to mention here a more utopian proposal due to Chandran Kukathaswhich nicely combines multicultural pluralism with the distinctiveness of particular communities that classical nationalism celebrates. Some of these individual islands might be quite unpleasant by liberal standards; what makes the archipelago liberal overall is that each community guarantees its dissenting members the right to exit which might have a high price, if former members have nowhere to go with any prospect for a decent life.
The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be sowhile the second level would be strongly liberal. The proposal nicely combines the traditional features of classical nationalism with very liberal, almost anarchic traits of the whole. Unfortunately, it is hard to see what would keep such an archipelago together without a strong unifying state, which Kukathas would not have.
A clear danger is a slide towards a multipolar achipelago, with some big and powerful islands say, a huge Islamic island, a huge EU-type island, and so on. Let me return to the main line of exposition. Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength, and cannot trump individual rights.
Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria.
Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value.
The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like. Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted.
The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don't share the same culture.
The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i. A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic.
Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice. Nationalist activism is most often turned against close and substantially similar neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work. It might, however, retain its potential force against culturally distant groups.
The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular.
There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups. Taylorconcluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. Critics of nationalism point out that flourishing might have too high a price, especially in the form of aggressiveness towards neighbors.
Yack notes the danger in situations where various factors combine against neighbors: Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people — we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature.
This claim certainly has some plausibility. For example, Nielsen writes: We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are.
This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof….
Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged.
For the opposite line, denying the importance of fixed and homogenous identity and proposing hybrid identities, see the papers in Iyall Smith and Leavy Philosophical nationalists claim that the nation is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities. Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures.
The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their own states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection. A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e. The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals.
I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality. An often-noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own. Each national culture contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. The most famous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin interpreting Herder, who first saw this idea as significantwrites: We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable.
The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture.
A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists? Should the protection of diversity be restricted to certain aspects of culture s proposed in full generality? The line of thought 1 is not individualistic.
And 5 can be presented without reference to individuals: But the other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual.
In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise a community, to which one has no choice whether or not to belong, is crucial for one's identity, or for flourishing or some other important good. This premise is coupled with the more narrow, nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task. However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive.
In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid. For an even more skeptical view stemming from social science, see Hale Hale's conclusion is worth quoting: Still, there is a lot to these arguments, and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures.
We conclude this sub-section by pointing to an interesting and sophisticated pro-national stance that developed by David Miller over the course of decades, from his work of to the most recent work of He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish and other ethnic identities.
Such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism, Miller claims. A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, even quite contrasting appearances. One seems to have a dilemma.
Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity.
Thick constitutional patriotism may be the only possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity.